In the Name of Defence by Steinbruner, John
Comment and analysis–
IN FEBRUARY of 2005, the US 
Department of Homeland Security 
announced the creation of a new 
facility to study the threat from 
biological weapons. The National 
Biodefense Analysis and 
Countermeasures Center (NBACC, 
pronounced en-back) is currently being 
built at Fort Detrick in Maryland at a 
projected cost of $128 million. It will 
have enough lab space to fill a football 
pitch, and 20 per cent of it will offer the 
highest level of containment, Biosafety 
Level 4, designed to handle the most 
dangerous and exotic pathogens. The 
entire compound will operate under 
the same level of secrecy used to 
protect nuclear weapons information 
and other matters of national security 
considered to be unusually sensitive.
This kind of secrecy is cause for 
concern because of the destructive 
potential NBACC will explore. It has 
said that it will study the genetic 
manipulation of pathogen virulence, 
the dynamics of aerosol dispersion and 
other ways of delivering biological 
agents. NBACC argues it is necessary to 
study advanced offensive applications 
of biotechnology so that protective 
countermeasures can be developed. 
The problem is that this kind of 
work may contravene the 1972 
Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BWC), which bans the 
development, production and 
stockpiling of biological weapons. 
NBACC says its work is defensive in 
character, but by secretly exploring 
potential offensive applications, the US 
is behaving in a way it would not 
tolerate from other countries. The 
danger, say critics, is that setting up 
such a facility could encourage other 
countries to do the same. And if that 
happens, NBACC will have helped to 
create the very threat it professes to 
counter. 
These concerns have barely 
registered in public discussion, but that 
is bound to change. Biotech research 
has huge implications. Techniques for 
making infectious diseases more 
virulent have already been identified. 
As the study of molecular bioregulators 
progresses it might become possible to 
devise infectious pathogens able to 
manipulate thoughts and feelings.
When the implications of these 
developments are become apparent to 
the wider public, there will be insistent 
demand for protective regulation. 
Because NBACC’s  explicit focus on 
threatening applications, the facility is 
likely to become a focus for attention. 
So how should it operate and under 
what kinds of rules? 
First, do no harm. This principle of 
the ancient Hippocratic oath was 
formalised in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, 
which banned the use of poison gas 
and bacterial agents, and later in the 
1972 BWC, which banned the 
development of biological weapons. It 
is at least implicitly accepted by all 
governments today. It is arguably 
among the most significant universal 
rules of human civilization. 
NBACC professes allegiance to this 
principle but justifies its exploration of 
the offensive potential of biological 
weapons by presuming unspecified 
enemies will violate the principle. That 
justification is likely to be contested by 
an increasingly clued-up public. If 
there is no legitimate threat, the 
legitimacy of threat assessment 
becomes questionable. 
NBACC justifies its presumption by 
citing the prominent historical 
instances of blatant violation – most 
notably, the use of biological agents by 
the Japanese Army in the second world 
war and the development of such 
weapons by the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War. But an informed world 
alert to the inherent dangers of 
biotechnology is not likely to tolerate 
any repeat of these episodes.     
Justifying a threat assessment also 
depends on what interest it serves, and 
on that question NBACC is again 
vulnerable to international objection. 
The work it proposes to undertake 
could endanger the human species as a 
whole. The national security interest of 
the US is profoundly linked to global 
public health and the latter will almost 
certainly be judged the predominant 
consideration. Threat assessment can 
only be justifiable if it serves this 
broader interest.
Consequently, NBACC will require a 
very different set of operating rules 
from the ones it has adopted. Each 
project must be judged on its own 
merit by people who understand both 
the science involved and the potential 
social effects. There can be no generic 
justification for threat-assessment 
projects. As with any important matter, 
the public will demand independent 
oversight of these judgments. That will 
mean involving competent people who 
are not exclusively beholden to NBACC 
or to the US. Given prevailing political 
attitudes, that will be a difficult to do, 
but whatever the difficulty NBACC will 
have to be made sufficiently 
transparent to reassure the domestic 
and international community.
Transparency, comprehensively 
applied and actively enforced, is an 
indispensable method of protection 
against the abuse of biotechnology. As 
it is currently conceived, NBACC is a 
threat to this safeguard, and will 
eventually have to be reformed, 
gracefully or otherwise. l
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Bioweapons research in the US could trigger just the sort of arms race it is meant 
to forestall. But that is the least of our worries, argues John Steinbruner
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